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Abstract
Proportionate  Reciprocity,  Modesty,  and  Democracy,  are  the  key  concepts  in  Aristotle’s  economics  of
exchange.  The  following  correspondence  of  these  concepts  with  modern  social  science  may  be
contemplated: (a) Ideally, reciprocal justice in bilateral bargaining to minimize expenditure given utility
levels results in Pareto-efficient, envy-free, equitable outcomes. (b) Practically, bargaining under the threat
or actual recontracting may act as a surrogate of reciprocal justice, leading to an N-person contract
topology.  (c)  But,  recontracting  is  subject  to  practical  limitations  too,  in  which  case  near-reciprocal
justice/general  equilibrium  outcomes  may  be  fostered  if,  as  a  surrogate  of  recontracting,  modesty in
interaction is exhibited in an evolutionarily-stable-strategy fashion. (d) That is, incomplete recontracting
amounts to asymmetric agent-type information, which in turn lays the ground for injustices; the same lack
of information prevents rectificatory justice from being efficient and hence, modesty can be efficient only if
it operates as a social norm and hence, only in a modest polity, which can be no other than democracy.
Keywords: reciprocal justice; reciprocal figures; general equilibrium; modesty;
JEL Classification: B11, D51, D63, D71, P16
1. Introduction
Book V of Aristotle’s (384-322 BC) Nicomachean Ethics has elicited the attention of
economists, because it contains Aristotle’s economics of exchange. It is the economics
implied by the concept of reciprocal justice, two-way justice or two-way equality in a
mutual fashion so to speak, which type of justice is possible to exercise only in voluntary
two-person exchange in the private sector. We shall see that it is specifically the concept
which has come to be known, from the 1670s and on, as the Golden Rule or Law, or Ethic
of Reciprocity. In its positive form, this rule urges to “Treat others how you wish to be
treated”, while in its negative form, “One should not treat others in ways that one would
not like to be treated” (Flew, 1979, p.134). This connection of exchange with this type of
justice is the reason why according to historians of thought, jurists and theologians were
the first to become interested in this subject matter, (see e.g. Gordon, 1975).
From the debate permutatio vs. emptio-venditio (barter vs. monetized exchange) and the
concept of iustum pretium (just price) of the Justinian account of the Roman-Byzantine
law, Corpus Juris Civilis (534 AD), to the medieval extension of the doctrine laesius
enormis (excessive inheritance) embodied in this law, by Carloman’s notion of negocium
(business transaction) in his Capitula (884 AD) and by the revivalists of this law in the
Bologna School of Law founded by Irnerius in 1084 AD. And, subsequently, from S.
Thomae  Aquinatis’ Summa  Theologica (1265/7-1273  AD)  and  the  Scholastics  (1300-
1600 AD) to Venerable Leonard Lessius’ De Justitia et Jure (1605 AD) and the dawn of
present-day economics by Adam Smith.
Consequently, an understanding of the Aristotelian economics of exchange should also be
able to provide an understanding of the post-Aristotelian approaches to exchange andVol. 6 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2014
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price formation. We see, for example, that the following mentality of the Schoolmen,
described by Gordon (1975, p. 260), mirrors Aristotle: “Most Schoolmen assumed that
even in the absence of monopoly, markets were rarely perfect. Some lack of knowledge
must  almost  be  present  and  could  be  tolerated  by  the  moralist.”  Also,  Blaug  (1991)
mentions  claims  that  Aristotle  anticipated  Jevon’s  theory  of  exchange  and  Menger’s
theory of imputation.  And, Jaffe (1974) maintains−as we do too, herein, but absolved
from the “obscurities in Book V” (Jaffe 1974, p. 385), which in the author’s opinion
plague Jaffe, too− that even Edgeworth’s contract curve is Aristotelian in origin.
Some, of course, like Schumpeter (1954), Meikle (1995), and Rothbard (1995) see no
economics in the Aristotelian economics of exchange, Ludwig von Mises (1963 [1949])
claims that these economics are simply fallacious while others like Theocarakis (2006, p.
9) think that “…the attempt to base subsequent economic analysis on his canon is utterly
untenable.”…or in terms of Pack’s (2008, p. 265) approach, “…Aristotle’s views are
completely at odds with all modern economic theory” though “…definitely… of interest
to some heterodox economists” (p. 278). Yet, the recent tendency to be finding arguments
refuting  Aristotle  just  because  the  academia’s  position nowadays  is  that  “[t]he
Aristotelian ideal that the world is rational, and if we try hard enough we can use our
own rationality to really grasp or approach that truth, is in retreat” (Pack, 2008, p. 276),
is equivalent to purposeful misinterpretation…
Anyway,  Theocarakis’ (2006)  work  does  offer  a  recent  critical  history  of  Aristotle’s
economics of exchange. One realizes going through this history that the source of the
confusion about “Aristotelian exchange” is the confusion about the definition of the term
“reciprocal figures” in Euclid’s Elements, (see e.g. Simpson, 1804), which opened the
doors to all sorts of philosophical speculative and in the end futile thinking. The author,
too, is inclined to “read Aristotle” with a philosophical eye, though, in my view, what he
wanted to say is quite clear, because Euclid’s notion of reciprocity should be in line with
the  universal  appeal  of  the  Golden  Rule  as  well,  and  hence,  anything  but  obscure.
Translations of Book V give a diagrammatic exposition of reciprocity too, attributing it to
Aristotle; but if there was indeed a figure in the original text, it must had been a Euclidean
geometric exposition, which “who knows” how it ended up to Nicolas Oresme’s poor and
inaccurate as we shall see diagram. Now, let us take things one at time.
A discussion of the Aristotelian price theory is prompted usually by the views he held
about the other forms of economic justice, which are the following two: First, exchange in
the absence of reciprocal justice would be involuntary and hence, subject to rectificatory
justice, which: “…has nothing to do with punishment proper but is only that of rectifying
a wrong that has been done, by awarding damages; i.e. rectificatory justice is that of the
civil, not of the criminal courts…[I]t brings A to the position A+C, and B to the position
B-C. The judge’s task is to find the arithmetical mean between these, and this he does by
transferring C from A to B.” (Ross, 1923, p. 300)
And,  second,  exchange  in  the  realm  of  public  economy  should  be  governed  by
distributive justice, “which distributes common possessions…in accordance with the kind
of proportion mentioned above”, (Ethics, 1131b:28-30), that is, in accordance with the
geometric progression, “(for in the case also in which the distribution is made from the
common funds of a partnership it will be according to the same ratio which the funds put
into the business by the partners bear to one another)”, (Ethics, 1131b:30-33).
Now,  the  question  that  usually  prompts  a  discussion  of  reciprocal  justice  is  that  if
rectificatory  and  distributive  justice  are  marked  by  the  arithmetic  and  the  geometric
proportion, respectively, shouldn’t there be a proportion underlying reciprocal justice,European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
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too? Indeed, voluntary two-person exchange is governed by proportionate reciprocity.
According  to  the  second  definition  in  the  sixth  book  of  Euclid’s Elements:  “Two
magnitudes are said to be reciprocally proportional to two others when one of the first is
to one of the other magnitudes as the remaining one of the last two is to the remaining
one of the first.” That is, given A/B, terms A and D will be reciprocally proportional to
terms B and C when they satisfy both of the proportions A/B:C/D and A/B:D/C. For
example, in 3/1:2/6, 3 is to 6 as 1 is to 2, or 3/6=1/2. And, in 3/1:6/2, 3 is to 6 as 1 is to 2,
or again, 3/6=1/2. The reciprocity lies in that C/D may become D/C and nothing else
change:  A/D=B/C  in  either  case,  which  equality  is  what  makes  reciprocity  to  be
geometrically constructible.
Returning back to Aristotle’s exchange economics, we shall see that in this example,
C= , D= , where p is price and x=A and y=B are quantities of the goods x and y by
traders A and B. For now, it suffices to point out the connection of relationship A/D=B/C
with  Golden  Rule:  It  is  a  relationship,  summarizing  according  to  Book  V  the
characteristics  of  traders  A  and  B.  The  understanding  of  Aristotelian  economics  of
exchange rests upon the understanding of these characteristics. Do they reflect a utility
approach to exchange or a producer-cost theory of value or both? And, it is only the
characteristics of traders A and B and their bargaining capacity that matter in determining
the ratio C/D or it is also the market, what others do, that matters as well? These are the
questions which have been puzzling implicitly or explicitly analysts of Aristotle’s views
on exchange all along.
The current thesis is that: “Aristotle’s limit on determination of the terms of trade appear
to be broad social determinants, bound up with inequalities of social status or acquired
skills of the persons responsible for production and exchange…Aristotle is endeavouring
to relate establishment of just terms of trade to that general framework of social realities
which condition and mould the interactions of economic variables.” (Gordon, 1975, p.
69) I attribute this thesis to the mistaken perception of the elements entering distributive
justice as elements influencing reciprocal justice, too. This mistaken approach blurs the
thematic structure and subsequently, the understanding of Book V as it stands regardless
the possible “corruptions of the text perpetrated by countless generations of copyists”.
(Jaffe, 1974, p. 385)
The thesis advanced herein has a follows: Aristotle develops first a bilateral trade model
that arrives at two-person equilibrium on the basis of the need of and output produced by
each trader. Bargaining based on reciprocal justice will result in a Pareto-efficient, envy-
free, equitable outcome. Next, as very well Winthrop (1978) observes, Aristotle points
out that all this is theory based on the assumption of choosing to do justice rather than
injustice when for some reason one of the bargaining parties can do have such a choice.
In the absence of reciprocal justice, agents bargaining in a recontracting fashion will end
up in a general equilibrium in which an excess demand by a particular trader is also in
aggregate excess demand. But, the real world is one in which neither recontracting can
match the outcome of reciprocal justice.
It takes modesty on the part of traders to minimize injustice, which modesty in turn may
be exhibited only in the context of a democracy. A discussion of the choice between
exchange justice (and any other kind of justice) and injustice should not be abstract, but
brought down to the practice of people in a democracy, to see what can make these people
come closer to the theoretical standard. The answer is “modesty” (in exchange and in any
in  general  interaction)  in  an  evolutionary-stable-strategy  fashion,  fostering  not  only
market exchange justice but also the continuity of all social norms upon which a virtuousVol. 6 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2014
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democratic  society  is  founded.  Modesty  consists  of  unconditional  trustworthiness  and
informal only sanctions in case of injustice. Democracy-modesty  as the basis of free
choice is what differentiates Aristotle from the other evolutionary models of cooperation
vs. self-interest like those of Falk et al. (2005), Fehr and Gachter (2000), Guttman (2003),
and Ostrom (2000).
2. On Proportionate Reciprocity
Proportionate reciprocity is advanced in Chapter 5 of Book V. It is advanced within the
context of barter exchange between 1133a:7 and 1133b:12, but not before an introduction
to reciprocity per se by the same chapter. It is neither the “an-eye-for-an-eye” notion of
reciprocity occupied by game theory and elsewhere nowadays (see e.g. Gouldner, 1960;
MacCormack, 1976; or Molm, 2010) nor any of the notions advanced by the standard
modern  works  on  Book V,  from  Grant  (1885)  to  Ross  (1923)  and  Stewart  (1973).
Aristotle’s introduction to reciprocity really says that although the deals with the public or
the  courts  may  not  engender  the  reciprocity  one  would  expect  from  a  deal,  such
reciprocity does exist in voluntary exchange. It consists of doing a trader business putting
his feet into the shoes of the trader with whom he is trading in so far as the “fairness” of
the terms of trade is concerned.  The main discussion of proportionate reciprocity is
followed by a discussion of monetary exchange, too, between 1133b:12 and 1133b:33 in
the same chapter.
In my opinion, the key passages from the main discussion and their interpretation have as
follows: “If then there is proportionate equality of goods, and then reciprocal action
takes place, the result we mention will be effected.” (Ethics, 1133a:12-14) The “result” is,
of course, proportionate reciprocity. If, for example, the equality of three kilograms of
wheat with one pair of shoes is agreed upon by a wheat farmer and a shoemaker, and then
two such pairs are exchanged for six kilograms of wheat, proportionate reciprocity will
have been effected.
But, what determines these terms of trade? Two things; intensity of need and production
technology: “…all things that are exchanged must be somehow comparable…All goods
must…be measured by some one thing…Now this unit is χρεία (need),…; but money has
become by convention a representative of need.” (Ethics, 1133a:22-35) And, “There will
be then reciprocity when the terms have been equated so that as farmer is to shoemaker,
the shoemaker’s έργον (productive effort) is to that of the farmer’s productive effort for
which it exchanges.” (Ethics, 1133a:38-40)
That is, the amount of money the shoemaker/farmer offers for the farmer’s/shoemaker’s
product shows “how badly” one needs the product of the other. And, when the ratio of the
amounts of money offered becomes proportional to the ratio of the volume of outputs
offered for exchange in the fashion:European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
19
that  is,  when  the  farmer/shoemaker  thinks  that  what  he  would  be  willing  to  pay  for
wheat/shoes if he was a shoemaker/farmer is what actually the shoemakers/farmer offers
to him, proportionate reciprocity will have been effected. Note parenthetically, that there
is as much labor theory of value and utility theory in Aristotle as needed to put forward
these expressions; we shall see that not even economics per se is his primary concern, let
alone the development of a theory of value…
Anyway, the proportions mentioned in the introductory section of this tract reflect this
wheat-shoes example, with A/B≡wheat/shoes and C/D≡offer for wheat/offer for shoes,
and  proportionate  reciprocity  is  given  alternatively  by  the  relationship:
A/D=B/C=>C/D=B/A, i.e. by the equalities,
or  numerically,  by  3/1=6/2,  which,  however,  equality  cannot  be  achieved  before  the
satisfaction of the following proviso, too: “…we must not bring them into a figure of
proportion  when  they  have  already  exchanged  (otherwise  one  άκρον  (end  of  the
bargaining) will have both υπεροχάς (advantages)), but when they still have their own
goods.” (Ethics, 1133a:4D-1133b:3)
This passage does two things: First, the part “when they still have their own goods”
introduces as the basis of bargaining the budget constraints:
and
where A and B are two persons specializing in the production of good y and x and having
produced and ̅ respectively, ( − ) = < 0,   is the volume of y to be exchanged
for x to get = > 0 and ( − ̅) = < 0 is the volume of x to be traded to
get = > 0.
Second, the two “advantages” in the parentheses above are one from being a seller and
selling high, and one from being a buyer and buying low. Consequently, the whole phrase
in  the  parentheses  states  that  the  double  unilateral  advantage  that  it  mentions,  is  not
desirable as a solution to bargaining. It follows that the second point of the passage is that
the  outcome  of  bargaining  will  be  in  accordance  with  proportionate  reciprocity  if  it
eliminates excess demands and supplies.
Indeed, adding prices and into the discussion, reciprocity becomes equivalent to
recognition that:
and proportionate reciprocity will have been effected when:
or the same, by the relationship:Vol. 6 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2014
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since at these equilibrium prices, either ( − ) + ( − 0) = 0 or ( − 0) +
( − ̅) = 0 imply that = or the same, that = , which yields
the above relationship. Are prices and “individualized” prices, the outcome of
bilateral bargaining, differing across bargaining couples in the market of a product?
If there is no recontracting, the answer will be in the affirmative: The quantities to be
exchanged are as fixed as the ratio A/B in the above proportions, which in turn implies
that two traders bargain to settle that ratio C/D≡ ⁄ which would minimize both the
individual and joint expenditure needed to ascertain a certain utility level on the part of
each trader. By Shephard’s Lemma, the resulting demand curves will be the Hicksian
rather than the Marshallian ones. Hence, at first sight it appears that reciprocal justice
wants the bargaining parties behaving in their role as sellers, as monopolists exercising
first degree price discrimination, appropriating each the consumer-cum-producer surplus
of  the  other  under  prices  equaling  marginal  production  costs.  And,  of  course,  the
similarity of production conditions is one reason why and should not be differing
across bargaining parties.
But, this is not the whole “story”; it is a warning that without market search via the threat
of or actual recontracting, one of the two parties may be victimized by the exchange,
because  the  consumer-cum-producer  surplus  lost  will  most  likely  exceed  the  surplus
gained by one of the two parties: “…one who gives what is his own, as Homer says
Glaucus gave Diomede ‘Armour of gold for brazen, the price of a hundred beeves for
nine’, is not unjustly treated; for though to give is in his power, to be unjustly treated is
not, but there must be someone to treat him unjustly. It is plain, then, that being unjustly
treated is not voluntary.” (Ethics, 1136b:10-15).
Glaucus  was  clearly  victimized  by  Diomede  despite  the  presence  of  voluntariness,
because: “…if a man assigns more to another than to himself, knowingly and voluntarily,
he treats himself unjustly; which is what modest people seem to do, since the virtuous
man tends to take less than his share. Or does this statement too needs qualification? For
(a) he perhaps gets more than his share of some other good, e.g. of honour or of intrinsic
nobility…” (Ethics, 1136b:18-23). Glaucus showed to Diomede nobility. Yet, strictly in
economic terms, exchange resulting in wealth redistribution a la Glaucus-Diomede is not
reciprocal justice; only the “voluntary” part of it is.
The notion of reciprocal justice becomes complete by noting that the other, the main
reason, why the price of any product should be unique in a monetized economy, is that:
“…all goods must have a price set on them” (Ethics, 1133b:17). It follows that the price
tag for a good should be reflecting the lower production cost of it as a matter of seller
competition. Consequently, what Aristotle wants to say is that agents, being aware of the
wealth-loss eventuality if they do not bargain within the broader context of recontracting
to obtain all the price information needed before the act of exchange, they will simply
bargain in a recontracting fashion; and by doing so the duality between Hicksian and
Marshallian demand may be attained. That is, reciprocal justice does not come about
based solely upon the good will of the bargaining parties, but by trying actively each
party to enforce such a will by the other party through recontracting: Aristotle couldn’t
possibly  ignore  ancient  Greek  drama’s  maxim  that: God  helps those  who  help
themselves…
But, again, if there are price tags, what is the use of bargaining? Which is the precise
content of recontracting? Consider toward this end a general decentralized equilibrium of
N-2 agents, having set the N-2 market-clearing price tags of two goods. The remaining 2European Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
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agents continue bargaining, leaving open the eventuality of ending up in terms of trade
which need not be identical with those in the N-2 market. Consequently, if the prices on
price tags are to be unique, all bargaining is pre-equilibrium bargaining, and can have
only  the  meaning  of  recontracting,  because,  in  the  absence  of  an  auctioneer,  only
recontracting can result in single market prices.
Aristotle is not explicit in that because his main concern was not economics but justice in
the city, (and/or because of corruptions in the text…). He is preoccupied with what will
happen to the city if price tags do not reflect reciprocal justice: “For it is by proportionate
requital that the city holds together” (Ethics, 1132b:36-39). And, he advances the price-
tag  argument  under  a  mentality  no  different  than  “…when  channel  members  are
concerned about fairness, the manufacturer can use a simple wholesale price above her
marginal cost to coordinate this channel both in terms of achieving the maximum channel
profit and in terms of attaining the maximum channel utility. Thus, channel coordination
may not require an elaborate pricing contract. A constant wholesale price will do.” (Cui
et al. 2007, p. 1303). Aristotle would add that sellers care for fairness in the first place,
because of the fear of recontracting; price tags try to preempt it.
In other words, reciprocal justice is Aristotle’s version of recontracting, and at a general
equilibrium  level,  the  result  is  an  N-person  Edgeworth/Walrasian  contract  topology.
Edgeworth and Walras isolate from Book V its economics, and present it in a formal way.
For Walras (1969 [1874], §99): “The exchange of two commodities for each other in a
perfectly competitive market is an operation by which all holders of either one, or of both
of  the  two  commodities  can  obtain  the  greatest  possible  satisfaction  of  their  wants
consistent with the condition that the two commodities are bought and sold at one and the
same rate of exchange throughout the market.” And, also: “According to Walras, it is not
by  violating  the  principle  of ‘justice  in  exchange’ that  the  injustices  of  the  existing
distribution of property are corrected, but by applying another set of principles, those of
‘distributive justice’.” (Jaffe, 1977, p. 373) That is, just exchange leaves wealth (property)
distribution intact, which if it is to be altered, it should be altered by public policy: All in
line with Book V except for the public-policy part which breaks the ground for the second
fundamental theorem of welfare economics. For Aristotle, income redistribution might be
thought of as being replaced by honor-nobility redistribution.
As very nicely Van Johnson (1939) remarks, reciprocal justice is equating agents in the
following fashion by design: “For it is not two doctors that associate for exchange, but a
doctor and a farmer, or in general people who are different and unequal; but these must
be  equated.”  (Ethics,  1133a:20-22).  Trade  should  not  be  altering  the  relative
socioeconomic position of the trading parties, because if it did, if one became richer at the
expense of the other, there would not be reciprocal justice: “…the justice in transactions
between  man  and  man  is  a  sort  of  equality  indeed,  and  the  injustice  a  sort  of
inequality…”, (Ethics, 1131b:33-34). Exchange induced equitability issues are thus not
raised. Enviousness issues are not raised too, and moreover, Pareto efficiency will be
insured when reciprocal justice in exchange amounts to putting himself a trader in the
other trader’s place and making−now we shall add−the other trader do the same. This is
the definition of reciprocal justice as an ideal.
But, by the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics, not even Pareto efficiency
alone can be achieved through the free market system before lump-sum transfers and
subsidies are effected among the agents. Aristotle does recognize this possibility, but
urges “modesty” and thereby, honor and nobility  in  exchange  (as in  everything else)
instead of government intervention. Aristotle dismisses income redistribution even fromVol. 6 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2014
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the viewpoint of the second welfare theorem, because who would consent to an income
loss  for  the  sake  of  Pareto  efficiency?  Instead,  one  should  run  to  the  judge  for
rectificatory justice. This plus the idealistic character of reciprocal justice are the reasons
making Aristotle dismiss market (exchange) as a principal factor shaping citizen behavior
and practice (see e.g. Winthrop, 1978) although he does acknowledge the inevitability of
the institution of the market. He thus addresses the nobility each man has inside him to
make him act in a modest way as a way of attaining not only near-Pareto efficiency but
near-genuine  democracy  as  well:  Once  man  chose  to  exchange  and  become homo
economicus, this can be done more efficiently as a homo politicus, much more so when
exchange without society is impossible. Then and only then one might consent to a Pareto
efficiency seeking income redistribution…
This is in sum the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of proportionate reciprocity
advanced herein. It is the core concept behind a microfoundation of city socioeconomics,
and of course, a discussion of “modesty” and to what “honor and nobility” amount to in
practice, is necessary to complete his overall approach to this subject. Such a discussion
follows immediately in the next section, concluding this one with a remark on the role of
money. Although the passages from Book V we used did mention money, the phrases
“offer for wheat” and “offer for shoes” did not, connoting offers either in kilograms of
wheat and pairs shoes, respectively, or in money: “…for it makes no difference whether it
is five beds that exchange for a house, or the money value of five beds” (Ethics, 1133b:32-
33).
3. On Modesty
Book V is divided into two parts. One, until Chapter 5, elaborates upon the principles of
justice, and the other, after Chapter 5, elaborates upon the issues that have to be taken into
account for the practical conformity to these principles in a democracy. Chapter 6 starts
by noting that: “…we must not forget that what we are looking for is not only what is just
without qualification but also political justice. This is found among men who share their
life with a view to self-sufficiency, men who are free and equal…” (Ethics, 1134a:29-32).
Political justice consists of natural and legal justice (Ethics, 1134b:23-30). Natural justice
is that which is universally true like the fire that: “…burns both here and in Persia…”
(Ethics, 1134b:33). Legal justice depends on societal form, referring to: “…things which
are just not by nature but by human enactment [and] are not everywhere the same…”
(Ethics,  1135a:4-7).  And,  according  to Politics,  the  best  by  nature  societal  form  is
democracy, because it is: “…the less evil form of government since it does not deviate
much from the kind of governance (exercised) by citizens themselves” (Politics, 1160b:22-
24)
The  keyword  for  the  understanding  of  the  context  in  which  the  notions  of  exchange
justice and modesty are advanced and hence, for the thorough understanding of these
notions per se, is the phrase “best by nature”; especially so given that this phrase does not
refer to natural justice. Nature refers to the voluntary rather than coercive foundation of
society, including market interaction, which is: “…the most elementary means to self-
sufficiency, for the sake of which it is believed that people formed society” (Politics,
1321b:17-19).  Or,  in  modern  terms,  to  those  social  norms  and  institutions  that  have
prevailed in an evolutionarily-stable-strategy fashion, the strategy choice being the oneEuropean Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
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between justice and injustice, which choice can be made freely and in favor thereby of
justice, only by: “…people who have an equal share in ruling and being ruled” (Ethics,
1134b:18-19). Such people can simply behave with modesty, being just and tolerating
injustice without fearing that this attitude will be taken as a weakness, because they do
have the option to exercise the eye-for-an-eye justice of Rhadamanthus: “Should a man
suffer what he did, the right justice would be done”, (Ethics, 1132b:31)
Consequently, what should be the focus of a study towards societal betterment is the
origin of the deviant strategy choice of doing the unjust in a democracy. What should be
of concern is the choice of injustice broadly defined, and not confined to the economic
being alone. This precisely concern is the subject matter of discussion after Chapter 5 of
Book V. The content of injustice has as follows: “Now when (1) the injury takes place
contrary to reasonable expectation, it is a misadventure. When (2) it is not contrary to
reasonable expectation but does not imply vice, it is a mistake…When (3) he acts with
knowledge but not after deliberation, it is an act of injustice…But when (4) a man acts
from choice, he is an unjust man and a vicious man” (Ethics, 1135b: 19-29) In the first
two instances, one: “…is not unjustly treated…[and] at most only suffers harm” (Ethics,
1136b: 25-30). Tolerance under these circumstances is meaningful and even in the case of
act of injustice.
But, one would not be immodest if one, aided by the police and courts, retaliated against a
vicious man whom, however, one cannot know beforehand that he is such a man and
avoid him. And, if the interaction with and injustice by such a man occur only once,
which is logical to assume since…”fool me twice, shame on me”,…it will be uncertain if
the injustice was done after deliberation or not. It is exactly this lack of interpersonal
information  which  lays  the  ground  for  injustice  as  a  strategy  choice  in  a  hit-and-run
fashion. Two interrelated questions come up immediately: Why doesn’t injustice spread?
And, why all injustice is not countered by Rhadamanthus-style retaliation? The answers
are equally interrelated, because both stem from the behavioral-public-good character of
democracy as follows.
First, note that pay-back-with-the-same-coin punishments should be decided by the civil
(as opposed to penal) courts, not imposed by the victims themselves. And, it is precisely
for this reason too, that retaliation is impossible, because which exactly is the “coin” if
the plaintiff cannot tell viciousness from act of injustice and even further, from mistake or
misadventure on the part of the suspect? In game-theoretic jargon, injustice is realized as
a noisy signal about player type. In a democracy, this lack of information is particularly
important, because modesty should be exercised by the judiciary as well, as crystallized
into  the  Roman  dictum: summum  jus  summa  injuria.  Indeed,  court  deliberations  in  a
democracy have to take into account that: “…acting unjustly is the worse, for it involves
vice and is blameworthy,…while being unjustly treated does not involve vice and injustice
in oneself. In itself, then, being unjustly treated is less bad…” (Ethics, 1138a: 37-42)
So,  if  asymmetric  information  and  modesty  on  the  part  of  the  judiciary  should  be
exhibited for the same reason it is done on the part of the citizen, mild only convictions if
any may produce. No Rhadamanthus-style retaliation is possible. But, how, then, injustice
does  not  spread?  The  answer  according  to  Aristotle  is  by  seeing  democracy  as  a
sociopolitical public good based on modesty as a social norm whose norm’s would-be
negative consequences are a cost in favor of this good. Modesty not only on the part of
the citizenry and of the judiciary but also of the statesmen and city (polis) executives:
“…we do not allow a man to rule, but rational principle, because a man behaves…in his
own interests and becomes a tyrant” (Ethics, 1134a:42-1134b:1).Vol. 6 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2014
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That is, democracy and modesty are put forward by Aristotle in the same spirit modern
game theory puts the provision of public goods in terms of social norms, which norm is:
“…1) a behavioral regularity; that is 2) based on a socially shared belief of how one
ought  to  behave;  which  triggers  3)  the  enforcement  of  the  prescribed  behavior  by
informal social sanctions. Thus, a social norm can be thought of as a sort of behavioral
public good, in which everybody should make a positive contribution−that is, follow the
social norm…” (Fehr and Gachter, 2000, p. 166) The norm is a public good itself, and as
far as modesty−tolerance, we would say today− is concerned, it is the top in virtue social
norm because it is the virtue consistent most with the informality of sanctions against its
violation, since modesty should be shown to sanctions against injustice as well.
Spreading the word that “Mr. X deceived me” is believed to be enough to bring Mr. X
back to order. This kind of cooperative behavior is advocated by Aristotle as a means of
preserving the continuity of a democratic society. According to Politics (1320a:2-6), the
continuity of a society depends more on the cooperative behavior making it possible than
in the character of the society, which for a democracy means, more on modesty than in
the democratic institutions. Consequently, modesty is a kind of cooperative interaction,
which is not found in game theory even though (a) the “typical cooperator” of game
theory is looked upon from the viewpoint of maintaining the societal arrangement of the
interaction too, and (b) Ostrom’s (2000), for example, “conditional cooperators” does
value the public-goods nature of reciprocity per se, deriving benefit beyond the objective
payoff when they reciprocate trust with trust, but suffering from intrinsic costs when they
fail to do so.
Note  that  these  considerations apply  to  any  society  and  not  necessarily  only  to  the
democratic one. This is also true for the conclusion that: “…if there is a noisy signal
about a player’s type that is at least more accurate than random, trustworthy types will
survive  as  a  substantial  proportion  of  the  population. Noisy  signals  may  result  from
seeing one another, face-to-face communication…” (Ostrom, 2000, p.145) This statement
presumes unconditional pre-exchange, pre-would-be-injustice, trust.  That’s exactly what
Aristotle presumes too, and arrives at the same conclusion; but he goes one step further
and asks what is the socioeconomic and political arrangement that would prompt the
emergence of such unconditional trust in the first place. And, his answer is: unconditional
cooperation is a matter of free choice, and free choice is maximized only in a democracy.
He also asks whether unconditional trust should continue to exist after acts of injustice,
and suggests that it should making at the same time public “noisy-signal” information.
Indeed, as very well Lubell and Scholz (2001, p. 160) put it: “(1) On average, initial
cooperators  gain  a  cooperators’ advantage  over  initial  defectors  due  to  defectors’
inability  to  take  advantage  of  reciprocal  environments;  (2)  Past  experience  with
reciprocity reduces exploitation even when reciprocity is currently absent, while past
experience  with  nonreciprocity  does  not  hamper  cooperation  when  reciprocity  is
currently present; and (3) Institutions that punish noncooperation enhance cooperation
by  initial  defectors,  but  reduce  cooperation  by  initial  cooperators.”  This  is  why,  in
practice,  as  for  example  Kahneman’s  et  al.  (1986,  p.  S285)  remark:  “Even  profit-
maximizing firms will have an incentive to act in a manner that is perceived as fair if the
individuals  with  whom  they  deal  are  willing  to  resist  unfair  transactions  and  punish
unfair firms at some cost to themselves... willingness to enforce fairness is common.”
And, in view of the qualification of the concept of reciprocity which is needed in the
presence of modesty, the kind of modern-day notion of it that might be endorsed by
Aristotle is perhaps Molm’s (1994, pp. 119-120) “reciprocal exchange”: “In reciprocalEuropean Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
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exchange, actors perform individual acts that benefit another, like giving help or advice,
without negotiation and without knowing whether or when the other will reciprocate. My
focus  on  reciprocal  exchange  came  out  of  my  early  training  in  behavioral  sociology
(Burgess and Bushell 1969); many of the early behavioral experiments were conducted
under minimal information conditions in which the reciprocal exchange of benefits was
all that subjects experienced, so reciprocity was very salient.”
4. Epilogue
It would be instructive to conclude this paper by asking why the economic and non-
economic elements are so much interwoven in Book V. This Book is the product of
circumstances too, which need to be discussed for a thorough picture of it. Toward this
end, note that: “The agora in Greece does not originally represent the market-place; first
of all it is closely bound up with the development of the polis as the site of political
gatherings.  Only  gradually  does  it  achieve  the  additional  use  of  a  place  of  internal
exchange.”  (Moller, 2000,  p.  71)  Also,  note  that  in Politics (1331a:19-1331b:18),
Aristotle proposes the separation of the “free agora” of politicians from the “exchange
agora”, which indicates the transformation of the political meeting place into a mixed
political-cum-market place by the 4
th century B.C.
This coupled with the fact that: “Greece in general was much more highly monetized in
the later fourth century, when Aristotle was writing.” (Trevett, 2001, p. 23) suggest that
the  socioeconomic  and  political  environment  of  those  times  was  one  of  all  sorts  of
imperfectly  competitive  phenomena,  being  shaped inter  alia by  the  give-and-take  of
politicians with people of the market, too; see e.g. Lewis, 1978). And, Aristotle could not
possibly  separate  the  two  in  a  discussion  of  justice,  placing  the  emphasis  on  the
sociopolitical rather the economic element in a manner no different than modern-day
quests for preventing democracy distortions by the economically powerful. His recipe
was moderation from all sides, as his second fundamental theorem of welfare after he had
worked out the first such theorem in terms of reciprocal-justice spirited recontracting.
Moderation  even  in  the  lifestyle,  because  he  does  know  from  the  Anonymous  of
Iamblichus that people get actively involved in politics only when they do not prosper,
and emphasizes that prosperity should be identified with autarky, with self-sufficiency:
“…we should not be motivated by greed, neither to think that the power needed to satisfy
greed is a virtue…” (Anonymous of Iamblichus, 1.6.1) As far as the fourth century is
concerned, autarky extends beyond self-sufficiency in a subsistence economy much as
modern-day autarky is what most households pursue through supermarket and shopping
center visits. When riches are condemned by Aristotle, they are not per se but when they
are used disorderly as a socioeconomic equilibrium destabilizing instrument, propagating
the disequilibrium stemming out of the practical limitations of recontracting.
In sum, bilateral bargaining under reciprocal justice can lead to Pareto efficient, envy-free
equitable  allocations.  But,  the  presence  of  such  justice  in  exchange  is  an  ideal  and
therefore, in practice bilateral bargaining should be taking place in a recontracting fashion
so that equilibrium-price tags may be posted in a market place. Yet, recontracting has its
practical limitations as well, and therefore, only modesty in exchange can prove to be
market stabilizing. And, modesty as a homo economicus can certainly be the case only
when  modesty  is  exhibited  as  a  broader  virtue  not  only  on  the  part  of  the  isolatedVol. 6 ♦ Issue 1 ♦ 2014
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individual but also collectively by the polity, which can be the case only in a democracy.
Aristotle does know of the redistributive practices that a state may engage in. But, instead
of invoking upon, for example, Samuelson-like lump-sum transfers from the young to the
elderly  within  the  context  of  the  second  welfare  theorem  to  attain  intergenerational
efficiency in a decentralized economy, he prefers to address the homo politicus inside the
homo economicus, (given that the primary motive for societal formations is the economic
one). This and the misunderstanding of Euclid’s reciprocal figures have been the reasons
for the confusion about what Aristotle had to say regarding market economic exchange.
On economic grounds, he is the ultimate laissez-faire advocator, but Ludwig von Mises
(1963 [1949]), for instance, cannot proclaim him as such, and very rightly so, because
simply the economic element is dominated eventually by Arnhart’s (1994), for example,
sociopolitical  darwinism.  And,  Schumpeter  (1954),  for  example,  cannot  see  any
economics in Book V, because he cannot appreciate the geometry of reciprocal figures,
and indeed, there are no economics, only a philosophico-socio-political discussion, when
this geometry is discarded.
It appears that all those issues in Aristotelian thinking considered to be making difficult
the reconciliation of this thinking with modern economic theory (see e.g. Pack, 2008), are
issues having been addressed herein from the viewpoint that Aristotelian economics have
to  wait  for much  further  development  on  the  part  of  the  “…series  of disjointed
mathematical puzzles,  expertise with math in general, sundry game theories, detailed
experiments demonstrating that people are not fully ‘rational’, etc” (Pack, 2008, p.275),
before they are really comprehended and become systematized toward the direction noted
by Crespo (2013, 2014) and Jill (2005); before modern economic theory comes to become
synonymous to Aristotelian economics and by extension to modern social science à la
Staveren (2001).
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